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Summary
According to Hartry Field, the mathematical Platonist is hostage of a dilemma. 
Faced with the request of explaining the mathematicians’ reliability, one option 
could be to maintain that the mathematicians are reliably responsive to a realm 
populated with mathematical entities; alternatively, one might try to contend 
that the mathematical realm conceptually depends on, and for this reason is 
reliably refl ected by, the mathematicians’ (best) opinions; however, both alterna-
tives are actually unavailable to the Platonist: the fi rst one because it is in ten-
sion with the idea that mathematical entities are causally ineff ective, the second 
one because it is in tension with the suggestion that mathematical entities are 
mind-independent. John Divers and Alexander Miller have tried to reject the 
conclusion of this argument—according to which Platonism is inconsistent with 
a satisfactory epistemology for arithmetic—by re-describing the second horn of 
the dilemma in light of Crispin Wright’s notion of judgment-dependent truth; 
in particular they have contended that once arithmetical truth is conceived in 
this way the Platonist can have a substantial epistemology which does not con-
fl ict with the idea that the mathematical entities exist mind-independently. In 
this paper I analyze Wright’s notion of judgment-dependent truth, and reject 
Divers and Miller’s argument for the conclusion that arithmetical truth can be 
so characterized. In the fi nal part, I address the worry that my argument gen-
eralizes very quickly to the conclusion that no area of discourse could be char-
acterized as judgment-dependent. As against this conclusion, I indicate under 
what conditions—notably not satisfi ed in Divers and Miller’s case, but possi-
bly satisfi ed in others—a discourse’s judgment-dependency can be successfully
vindicated.
* Researcher C2007, co-fi nanced by FSE and POPH.
68
Introduction: the Euthyphro contrast, and Wright’s notion of judgment-depen-
dent truth
According to C. Wright, the satisfaction of the Principle of Knowability 
(PK)—according to which p entails that it is possible to know that p—is 
not suffi  cient to distinguish between areas of discourse deserving an antire-
alist interpretation and those which deserve a realist interpretation. Contra 
M. Dummett, who has championed the opposite view, Wright suggests 
that more must be added to vindicate antirealism concerning some debated 
topic than simply showing that the relevant discourse is subject to PK.
Suppose in fact that every true statement expressible within a discourse 
is such that, under the appropriate circumstances of epistemic optimality, 
it is judged to be so, and vice versa, that any judgment issued in condi-
tions of epistemic optimality is true. Th e bi-conditional which expresses 
this relation:
(EC) p  (C  Jp)
(where C specifi es the conditions of epistemic optimality relative to the 
range of statements over which p varies, and J is to be read as “it is judged 
that”), entails the satisfaction of PK1, yet it still leaves underdetermined 
whether we should attach explanatory priority to its right-hand side, or to 
its left-hand side. Much in a realistic spirit, in fact, one could hold that the 
1. If every true statement in a discourse is such that, under the relevant optimal epistemic 
conditions, it is judged to be true, satisfaction of PK follows from the natural assumptions that 
(a) knowledge is justifi ed true belief, that (b) the epistemic conditions mentioned in the right-
hand side of the bi-conditional are such as to confer justifi cation on the opinions they enable, 
that (c) these conditions are possibly instantiated, and that (d) if the antecedent of a condi-
tional is possible, so is its consequent. Suppose in fact that a discourse D sustains the relevant 
bi-conditional: it follows, by (a), (b), and (c) that there are possible circumstances under which 
every truth in the discourse is known. By (d), it then follows that every truth is possibly known. 
To be noted, premise (a) does not ignore the familiar counterexamples proposed by Gettier 
against the standard defi nition of knowledge; rather, it is proposed  on the assumption that the 
“optimal epistemic conditions” referred to within the bi-conditional are such as to escape usual 
Gettierization. Admittedly, much more could be said to support (a); however, it seems sensible 
to suppose that whatever additional material is needed to escape Gettier-like counterexamples, 
it must be already in place if the conditions under which every statement is assessed are to count 
as “optimal”. Finally, to call into question the sense of possibility referred to within (c) would be 
of no help in resisting the entailment. For whatever sense of possibility one has in mind when 
requiring those epistemic conditions to be possibly instantiated must obviously be the same one 
has in mind when advocating the principle that every truth is possibly known. 
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reason why every truth in the discourse would be judged if the epistemic 
conditions were good enough is that, under those conditions, we would 
be best suited to detect the facts in that area, to the extent that not even a 
single fact could remain unstated; on the opposite direction, however, one 
could hold that matters are the other way around: one could oppose the 
detectivist view, advanced by the realist, and maintain that being judged 
in conditions of epistemic optimality is the conceptual ground of truth in 
the discourse.
Th is opposition between the realist and the antirealist gives rise to what 
Wright—echoing Plato’s dialogue—has dubbed the Euthyphro Contrast: 
according to Socrates—the realist character—it is a merit of the alleged 
conditions of epistemic optimality that they put us in a position to know 
everything there is to know within a given area; according to Euthyphro—
the antirealist character—judgment in conditions of epistemic optimality 
is the raison d’etre of truth in the discourse.
To give content to this opposition Wright has cheerfully described a 
recipe for resolving the dispute, by devising a range of conditions which a 
discourse subject to EC will have to meet if, intuitively, it is to deserve (or 
fail to deserve) a realist interpretation2. Th e fi rst one is a meta-condition: 
when specifying the debated bi-conditional, for p ranging over the state-
ments expressible within some specifi c discourse, the relevant C-conditions 
must be specifi ed substantially. In a word, this means that such conditions 
do not have to make the principle itself trivially true, but must be specifi ed 
in light of a “constructive epistemology” for the statements in question. 
Suppose in fact that, for p ranging over ascriptions of colour to middle-
sized perceptual objects, one specifi ed EC as follows:
(EC*)  p  (the epistemic conditions are good enough to guarantee 
that if p is true then it is judged that p  Jp).
As it is clear, EC* fails to tell us something informative concerning 
the conditions which would guarantee—one way or another—that every 
colour ascription would be true, and that every colour  a thing possesses 
2. Wright’s discussion of the Euthyphro Contrast initially concentrates on bi-conditionals 
like (EC) (1992, 108); however, in view of the potential diffi  culty that the obtaining of C could 
interfere with the truth-value of p, and so engender the so-called conditional fallacy, he ends 
up proposing provisional equations like the following: C  (p  it is judged that p) (1992, 
119). Nothing signifi cant, in the present paper, hangs on whether we choose either formulation; 
therefore I decided to stick to the initial one conveyed by EC.
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would be ascribed. However, this is not its gravest shortcoming. To see 
why will help locate the proper function of the second condition envis-
aged by Wright.
Suppose that the Socratic theorist is right, and that the satisfaction of the 
C-conditions indeed puts us in a position to detect every truth expressible 
within D. In this case, it seems sensible to suppose that this fact must hold 
contingently, and that we can come to know this fact only a posteriori, upon 
assessing our own cognitive undertakings with respect to the D-domain. 
In fact, it seems conceivable that our own epistemic set-up, or the features 
of our epistemic play-ground might have been otherwise than they are; so 
it is natural to suppose that, if the proper determination of a set of truths 
is conceptually independent of our investigative practice, the conditions 
under which we are (or would be) best placed to detect a given body of 
truths might have failed to be so3. On the other hand, suppose that it is the 
Euthyphronist who is right, and that the D-truths are merely constituted 
by the opinions delivered under the C-conditions. In this case it is sensible 
to suppose that this fact must hold necessarily, and that we can come to 
know it a priori, by refl ecting on the conceptual link between best opinion 
and truth in the discourse. If that much is conceded, the reason why we 
should be willing to enforce the requirement that the C-conditions must 
be specifi ed substantially, i.e. in a way which does not render the relevant 
instance of EC trivially true, is that every unsubstantial instance, like EC* 
above, is both necessarily true, and knowable a priori, and so such as to 
prevent by defi nition the desired modal and epistemological opposition 
from arising. In a word, the C-conditions must be specifi ed so as to leave 
it open that the relevant instance of EC may turn out to be contingent 
and a posteriori.
A third condition4 proposed by Wright to adjudicate the Euthyphro 
Contrast about a given area of discourse D requires that the C-conditions 
3. “[…] [I]f, as according to Socrates’ detectivist view, best opinion is merely responsive to 
truth, then it seems that it ought to be a possibility that the causal order be so constituted that 
the opinions formed under the conditions which, as things are, ensure that they track the facts, 
might not have done so.” (Wright 1992, 112)
4. Wright also proposes as a fourth condition the Extremal Condition. Th is condition has the 
function of discriminating among “recognizably a priori true, substantially specifi ed [EC-instanc-
es] whose C-conditions avoid all use of the distinctive concepts of the discourse” (1992, 123) 
which sustain an Euthyphronic interpretation from those which sustain the (Socratic) suspect that 
the range of facts with which we are dealing, though conceptually independent of our cognitive 
activity, is one in which simply “there is, a priori, no possibility of their misrepresentation by best 
opinion” (ibidem). Th e idea is that the satisfaction of the fi rst three conditions—substantiality, 
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mentioned by the relevant instance of EC, if its Euthyphronic interpreta-
tion has to be vindicated, be specifi ed independently of the presupposi-
tion that some D-truths have already determined extensions. Suppose 
in fact that, when trying to assess the status of a given instance of EC, 
one specifi ed the conditions of epistemic optimality associated to colour 
ascriptions by requiring that an object be stable in colour throughout a 
period of observation for the opinion thereby delivered to count as best. 
Clearly, in this case the conditions which have to be satisfi ed if an opin-
ion to the eff ect that a given object is red is to count as best must already 
include that the object has instantiated, throughout the relevant period 
of observation, one single chromatic property. However, according to the 
Euthyphronist it is the very truth value of this kind of statements—colour 
ascriptions—that the opinion delivered under the conditions of epistemic 
optimality so described must determine. If one nonetheless pleads for 
an Euthyphronic interpretation of the relevant instance of EC, clearly 
inconsistency threatens5, so that the upshot of the irreducible presence 
of statements in the discourse whose truth-value is logically antecedent to 
the very satisfaction of the associated C-conditions must inescapably be 
the vindication of its Socratic interpretation. It follows that the satisfac-
tion of the independence condition constitutes a necessary condition for 
establishing the Euthyphronic interpretation, and that failure to specify 
the C-conditions associated to a discourse independently of the truth of 
some statements expressible within it constitutes a suffi  cient condition 
for accepting the realist interpretation endorsed by the Socratic theorist. 
Th is rough presentation of the Euthyphro Contrast should suffi  ce to 
illustrate Wright’s notion of judgment-dependent truth in terms of the 
following principle:
necessity and a priori knowability, and independence—may to some extent leave undetermined 
whether the best opinions in a discourse are guaranteed a priori to track the facts not as a result 
of the conceptual implication of human responses in the determination of their extensions, but 
rather as a result of some general feature of the corresponding truth-conferring states of aff airs. 
5. Th e inconsistency at issue is not one of circularly characterizing the truth-conditions of 
p (left-hand side of EC) in terms of the opinions delivered in epistemic conditions whose speci-
fi cation requires the use of p itself (right-hand side of EC). I agree with Wright, who explicitly 
maintains that EC-instances involving C-conditions specifi ed less-than-independently, since 
they are not proposed as reductive analyses, do not have to face this specifi c objection from 
circularity. Rather, the inconsistency at issue is one of maintaining that truth in a discourse, for 
instance the chromatic one, is constrained by best opinion while at the same time explaining 
what makes opinion best by “implicitly presupposing some mode of constitution of color facts 
which is conceptually unconstrained by best opinion and hence potentially at odds with the 
Euthyphronist’s central claim” (1992, 121). 
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(JD-T)  Th e truth-predicate fi nding application within a discourse A 
is judgment-dependent iff , for p ranging over A-statements, 
a substantial and independent specifi cation of the associated 
conditions of epistemic optimality gives rise to a necessary 
and a priori true instance of EC (whose explanation cannot 
proceed by invoking the special nature of the implicated truth-
conferring states-of-aff airs). 
In this paper I shall not be primarily concerned with JD-T; rather, I 
shall address a recent proposal, advanced by J. Divers and A. Miller, which 
puts this principle at the service of rescuing Arithmetical Platonism from 
a recent challenge, advanced by H. Field, to explain the mathematicians’ 
reliability as knowledge-gatherer consistently with the claim that math-
ematical objects are abstract, and mind-independent. Along with the 
authors’ suggestion, the Platonist can successfully meet Field’s challenge 
by contending that arithmetical truth is judgment-dependent, much in 
the sense conveyed by JD-T, and by arguing that this supposition still 
makes room for the idea that, under a certain respect, mathematical 
objects do exist independently of the mind. Elsewhere (Piazza 2009) 
I have suggested that the latter claim—that arithmetical truth can be 
coherently thought to be judgment-dependent, and nonetheless to con-
cern a mind-independent realm of entities—can be made to work only 
against a notion of mind-independent existence which is philosophically 
dubious and, moreover, hardly relevant to the realism/antirealism issue. 
However, it is undeniable that Divers and Miller’s position would still 
deserve a great deal of interest, were it possible to show that it is the 
only form of Platonism—no matter how weak, and how unsatisfactory 
the notion of mind-independent existence upon which it is based—to 
which a sound epistemology, consistent with Field’s challenge, could be 
made available. And it is also undeniable that, were it possible to show 
that arithmetical truth is judgment-dependent, this desideratum could 
be made available quite straightforwardly: if arithmetical truth is con-
stitutively dependent on what mathematicians would judge, were they 
to operate in conditions of epistemic optimality, in order to explain the 
mathematicians’ reliability it is suffi  cient to accept the natural supposi-
tion that the conditions under which they actually operate, at least in 
the most fortunate cases, are good enough for the opinion they deliver 
to be taken to constitute, and a fortiori trivially to track, arithmetical
truths.
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In what follows my principal aim will be to argue against the main 
premise in Divers and Miller’s proposal, namely the judgment-dependent 
nature of arithmetical truth, and so to dispel the appearance of a cheap 
epistemological vindication of the specifi c branch of Platonism they off er, 
under the heading of Non-Gödelian Platonism. However, the specifi c 
reasons I shall propose against the characterization of arithmetical truth 
as judgment-dependent will also raise more general worries concerning 
the very principle JD-T, namely the potential inconsistency, for every 
conceivable discourse, between the satisfaction of the substantiality con-
dition and of the independence condition. Th erefore, in the fi nal part of 
the paper, I shall address the very JD-T, and try to indicate under what 
conditions—remarkably not satisfi ed in the arithmetical case—a discourse 
can consistently be taken to sustain it. 
Field’s Dilemma, and Non-Gödelian Platonism
In order to illustrate the dilemma proposed by Field, let’s start with a rather 
uncontroversial characterization of Arithmetical Platonism. According to a 
common presentation, the position endorsed by the Platonist is the seman-
tic interpretation of arithmetical discourse according to which arithmetical 
statements are true or false of a mind-independent and abstract realm of 
entities—numbers—which have no spatial and temporal collocation.
Now, consider the following schema:
(1) If mathematicians accept that p, then p.
With any arithmetical statement instead of p, both the Platonist and 
her opponent accept that (1) is at least in the majority of the cases true. 
However, how can the Platonist explain (1)? Certainly she “cannot explain 
the mathematicians beliefs and utterances on the basis of the arithmetical 
facts being causally involved in the production of those beliefs and utter-
ances” (Field 1989, 230), because arithmetical objects, according to her, 
are abstract, therefore causally ineff ective. Nor is it open to the Platonist 
to “essay an explanation of mathematical reliability according to which 
the ‘relation’ between mathematical thoughts and mathematical truth is 
constitutive rather than causal. Th e idea would be that, rather than detect 
the constitutively independent mathematical facts, mathematicians’ (and 
perhaps others’) relevant beliefs actually constitute these facts” (Divers and 
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Miller 1999, 280). Such an explanation, it could be argued, would be in 
tension with the mind-independence of mathematical objects, a trait that 
is no less vital for Platonism than it is their abstract nature.  In the absence 
of any other proposal as to how (1) could be explained, the alternatives 
so far reviewed can be assumed to exhaust the logical space. Th erefore, if 
Field is right, no alternative is open to the Platonist. But is Field right?
Not quite, is Divers and Miller’s answer. To begin with, they address the 
question about the proper meaning to be given to the Platonist’s contention 
that mathematical entities exist independently of the mind. According to 
the authors, a claim to the eff ect that a given entity exists mind-indepen-
dently has to be analyzed along the following lines. First, concerning the 
implicated notion of existence, they endorse Wright’s Syntax Priority Th esis 
(SPT), and maintain that the existence of any entity E is guaranteed by 
the truth of any statement featuring an expression to which, by surface 
syntactic criteria, it is sensible to attribute the function of a singular term, 
purporting to refer to E; since they endorse the twofold presupposition that 
(i) at least some arithmetical statements are true, and (ii) that they have 
the appearance of implicating singular terms—numerals—purporting to 
refer to numbers, they then conclude that numbers exist6. Secondly, as to 
the notion of mind-independent existence, they say that an object exists in 
this way if and only if the truth of any statement involving (syntactically 
appreciable) singular reference to it is not constrained by the presence of 
minds. In other words, they maintain that for any p of the indicated kind, 
involving a singular term which purports to refer to E,
(2)  E exist mind-independently iff  (it is true that p  there are no 
minds).
To the extent to which the latter principle is taken to explicate the 
notion of mind-independent existence endorsed by the Platonist, Field’s 
dilemma then becomes a challenge to explicating the mathematicians’ 
reliability consistently with it. Seen under this perspective, though, its 
second horn begins to look more promising. Here is Divers and Miller’s 
suggestion.
Suppose you are willing to give content to the metaphor of fact-consti-
tution, mentioned within the second horn of Field’s dilemma, by adverting 
6. For both a proper statement of the Syntax Priority Th esis, and its application to the 
mathematical case see Wright (1983, 6 ff .)
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to Wright’s principle J-DT. If you also maintain that the correct inter-
pretation of the following bi-conditional, for p ranging over arithmetical
statements,
(3) p  (C  Jp),
is the Euthyphronist’s, you are then allowed to maintain that arithmetical 
truth is, in the sense just advertised, judgment-dependent. Not unexpect-
edly, this puts you in a position to explain the mathematicians’ reliability. 
If arithmetical truth is judgment-dependent, the explanation why math-
ematicians tend to have things right just requires the reasonable suggestion 
that, at least in the most favourable cases, they already operate in epistemic 
conditions that are suffi  ciently close to the optimal ones to guarantee the 
coincidence of arithmetical opinion and arithmetical truth. More unex-
pectedly, though, you also achieve a position from which the consistency 
of the latter explanation with (2) above can be easily vindicated. Th e Syn-
tax Priority Th esis and (2) together motivate the thought that an entity 
exists independently of the mind just provided that a statement involving 
syntactically appreciable singular reference to it is possibly true in worlds 
where there are no minds. Th e consistency of the judgment-dependent 
nature of arithmetical truth with the mind-independence nature of math-
ematical entities therefore just requires that arithmetical statements may 
be (judgment-dependently) true in worlds where no minds exist; and 
there seem to be no principled reason why they should not: in order for 
an arithmetical statement p to be (judgment-dependently) true in a world 
w where no mind exists, it seems suffi  cient that w is such as to satisfy the 
counterfactual condition according to which, were mathematicians to exist 
and to judge in conditions of epistemic optimality, they would judge that 
p. Provided that a suitable explanation of the advertised counterfactual 
convergence in opinion of the mathematicians operating in conditions of 
epistemic optimality is available, then, no potential inconsistency seems to 
threaten the duo judgment-dependent truth/mind-independent existence 
(as to what is implicated by the request of such an explanation, see the 
fi nal sections of this paper). Accordingly, there seems to be no principled 
diffi  culty in the proposal according to which Field’s challenge can be met 
by explaining the mathematicians’ reliability, on condition that arithmeti-
cal truth is correctly characterized as judgment-dependent in nature.
Is, however, the latter characterization correct? Th e next few sections 
will be devoted to assessing the arguments which Divers and Miller present 
76
to vindicate this claim, and to arguing, much in the opposite direction, 
that it should not be accepted.
Arithmetical truth as judgment-dependent truth?
As seen in the introductory section, the claim that arithmetical truth is 
judgment dependent in Wright’s sense commits one to showing that there 
is a substantial and independent specifi cation of the C-conditions men-
tioned by the following bi-conditional, where p ranges over arithmetical 
statements,
(3) p  (C  Jp),
which makes it necessarily and a priori true; moreover, it commits one 
to showing that the advertised modal and epistemological features of (3) 
cannot be explained by mentioning the special nature of the implicated 
truth-conferring (arithmetical) states-of-aff airs. In what follows, I set forth 
to scrutinize Divers and Miller’s argument to the eff ect that there is such 
specifi cation. As I will try to show, Divers and Miller’s identifi cation of 
the relevant C conditions seems to raise two central worries: the fi rst one 
concerns the very truth of (3); the second one is relative to the simultane-
ous satisfaction of the substantial and independent condition.
Let us begin by inspecting the “constructive epistemology” which moti-
vates Divers and Miller’s contention that the C-conditions they specify in 
the arithmetical case indeed respect the substantiality condition.
Divers and Miller are rather explicit in declaring their strategy:
Th e accuracy of a subject’s judgment is secured en passant by the core condi-
tion of conceptual competence […]. Th e crucial and advantageous feature of 
the arithmetical case is that (maximal) conceptual competence alone suffi  ces 
for accuracy of judgment so long as arithmetic is conceived as knowable a 
priori and, indeed, as analytic (Divers and Miller 1999, 296).
Th e suggestion seems to be twofold. On the one hand, it seems to 
incorporate a general epistemological principle to the eff ect that
(4)  If p is analytic, then p is knowable a priori by exercising one’s mas-
tery of the constituent concepts of p.
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Naturally enough, (4) suggests that 
(4*)  if p is analytic, maximal conceptual competence with the constitu-
ents of p is suffi  cient to make the best judgment as to whether p7.
By the second contention,
(5)  Arithmetical truths are analytic,
(4) and (4*) entail that the epistemic conditions C under which arithmeti-
cal opinions are to be counted as best simply require maximal competence 
with the arithmetical concepts. So, if arithmetical truth is to be regarded 
as judgment-dependent, it must be the case that the condition of maximal 
conceptual competence is indeed sustained by a constructive epistemol-
ogy for mathematics, and that it is an a priori and necessary truth that 
arithmetical truth varies with opinion delivered in condition of maximal 
conceptual competence. In what follows I shall advance two major worries 
against the latter suggestion. 
To begin with: if the conditions under which arithmetical opinion is 
to be regarded as best are conveyed by (4) and (4*) above, it is doubt-
ful that (3) is as much as true. Just consider Goldbach’s Conjecture, and 
assume, for the sake of argument, that it has a determinate truth-value 
(if your Dummettian faith doesn’t allow you to dare that much, take as 
an example any currently undecidable sentence which will be decided8). 
Suppose further that it is indeed true. Endorsement of (3) commits you 
to maintaining that were we to address the question whether Goldbach’s 
7. In its literal interpretation, (4*) is obviously false. Many further conditions, like reporting 
and background psychological conditions must be added to make maximal conceptual compe-
tence suffi  cient for best judgment. For instance, the opinions reported by S under C must be 
safe from material self-deception, slip of the tongue, S must be attentive, cognitively lucid, etc. 
However, such conditions must be arguably included within the specifi cation of the C conditions 
for every discourse whose judgment-dependence is under dispute. For the sake of brevity, I just 
omit reference in (4*) to such conditions, and concentrate upon the condition whose satisfaction, 
according to Divers and Miller, is decisive for best judgment in the mathematical case. It must 
be kept in mind that (4*) presupposes the satisfaction of the other conditions.
8. I guess that an intuitionist should not fi nd this second request contentious. On the one 
hand, I agree that a sentence’s current undecidability should ban one from endorsing any consid-
ered opinion about whether it will be decided. However, on the other hand, even an intuitionist 
should grant that the actual mathematical practice does deliver good inductive evidence for the 
belief that at least some currently undecidable sentences will be decided, as mathematicians often 
prove sentences which before have been undecidable. 
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Conjecture is true in conditions of epistemic optimality, we would judge 
that it is. Yet, the question whether Goldbach’s Conjecture is true is one 
that, right now, we are already addressing, and no one has ever ventured 
an opinion, as our current situation is not one in which we are justifi ed 
in believing one way or another. So, it seems to follow that no one has, 
until now, addressed that very question under the appropriate (optimal) 
conditions. For an opinion about Goldbach’s Conjecture to count as best, 
under the current proposal, it is however for it to be delivered by someone 
who is maximally conceptually competent with its ingredient concepts. 
Th erefore, it seems to follow that no one, at the moment, is endowed 
with a grasp of the relevant concepts which is suffi  ciently fi rm. However, 
this is absurd; there seems to be nothing amiss in our current grasp of the 
concept of a prime number, the concept of an even number, the concept 
of a sum, etc. So, either we renounce the idea that having maximal con-
ceptual competence is what makes arithmetical opinion best, or we retain 
that idea, and then renounce the claim that opinion delivered in optimal 
epistemic conditions varies with truth. To the extent to which no alterna-
tive conception of the C-conditions is proposed, one would then seem to 
be forced to choose the second alternative, and then to drop (3).
An important moral to be drawn from the argument above, arguably, is 
about why (4) and (4*) above do not suffi  ce to vindicate (3). Th e contrary 
impression might stem from the nowadays widespread opinion that the 
notion of analyticity, if it has to play any respectable philosophical role, 
must be interpreted epistemically. Th is view, although already present in 
M. Schlick’s refl ections on the nature of a priori knowledge, has most 
recently been rehearsed by P. Boghossian (1996). Boghossian contrasts 
what he calls the “metaphysical conception” to the “epistemic concep-
tion” of analyticity. Roughly, a sentence is metaphysically analytic if the 
mere fact that the sentence means what it does makes it the case that what 
the sentence says is true. In turn, a sentence is epistemically analytic if 
knowledge of its meaning suffi  ces for attaining knowledge to the eff ect 
that what it expresses is indeed true. Th is is not the place to rehearse the 
arguments Boghossian presents against the metaphysical conception. For 
what matters, I fi nd them very persuasive. What here matters is that these 
arguments are also supposed to pave the way to the epistemic conception, 
and to that extent I don’t agree they succeed. Th e reason, already surfac-
ing in the argument above, has been clearly stated for the fi rst time by 
W. Künne in a critical review of the diff erent conceptions of analyticity 
emerging from Schlick’s work. Among the other things, Künne discusses 
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Schlick’s claim that all analytic statements are trivial, namely such that 
whoever understands them cannot fail to accept them as true. Künne’s 
criticism of Schlick’s thesis is that:
we should be saying something correct, when maintaining that a person does 
not understand, for instance, a tautological statement S, even if this person 
understands each part of S and masters the syntax of the language to which S 
belongs, and even if he knows how to ascertain whether it is in fact a tautology; 
it seems clear that someone who still ignored the truth-value of S could well 
satisfy these conditions. Such use of the word “understand” would certainly 
be an abuse (my translation, 1982, 214).
Künne’s point, simply enough, is that, in many cases, knowledge of a 
logical or of an arithmetical sentence is mediated by proofs. To the extent 
to which knowledge of the meaning of their constituting expressions, and 
of the way they are put together, is consistent with one’s inability to fi gure 
out a proof, and to the extent to which logical and arithmetical sentences 
are regarded as paradigm examples of analyticities, knowledge of the mean-
ing of the constituting expressions of an analytic sentence, and of the way 
they are put together, is not in general guaranteed to yield knowledge. 
Mutatis mutandis, Künne’s criticism of Schlick’s characterization of analytic 
sentences as ones expressing trivialities applies to Boghossian’s conception 
of epistemic analyticity. Accordingly, the reason why Divers and Miller’s 
vindication of (3) fails, at bottom, is the failure of Boghossian’s notion of 
epistemic analyticity9.
9. Th ere is, of course, a more charitable reading of Boghossian’s proposal which allows preser-
ving epistemic analyticty in the face of the failure of (3). According to a more modest interpreta-
tion, Boghossian might be taken to say that whenever a sentence is analytic, one’s justifi cation for 
believing what it says—were one to be justifi ed—will entirely derive from one’s understanding of 
its constituting expressions, and the way in which they are put together. Along with this reading, 
one’s understanding of an analytic sentence is not guaranteed to yield justifi cation for believing what 
it says; the guarantee we have is that if one is justifi ed in believing an analytic sentence, then the 
materials upon which this justifi cation supervenes enterly derive from one’s understanding of the 
sentence; so a person’s understanding an analytic sentence in this (more modest) sense is compatible 
with her failing to be justifi ed in believing what it says. Th is modest reading is clearly unserviceable 
to the non-Gödelian Platonist, though: what she needs is a principle which guarantees maximal 
conceptual competence invariably to result in knowledge, and only epistemic analyticity in the 
stronger reading seems to deliver one which is fi t to this role. Moreover, Boghossian also maintains 
that whoever understands an analytic sentence, although possibly failing to be justifi ed in believing 
what it says, must be credited with an entitlement (much in T. Burge’s sense) to believe what it says, 
namely a distinctively epistemic right to accept the sentence. So long as one is not disposed to say 
that we currently are (or at least that some mathematician currently is) entitled to believe (or to 
disbelieve) Goldbach’s conjecture, also the modest reading then seems to face its own problems.
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Th e latter contention is, admittedly, rather bold. So, it seems advisable 
to let the success of the strategy I am pursuing be as much as indepen-
dent from it. Th e remainder of this section is then designed to off er one 
additional argument which does not rest on the rejection of the notion 
of epistemic analyticity.
Let us then suppose, for the argument’s sake, that for an arithmetical 
sentence to be analytic it is for it to be epistemically analytic. If we make 
this supposition, then (3) is much more plausible under the specifi cation 
of the relevant C conditions conveyed by (4) and (4*). In this case, how-
ever, the crucial question is about whether, so specifi ed, the C conditions 
meet the Substantiality and Independence conditions. What follows is an 
argument to the eff ect that they don’t.
Before getting started, however, once again it is necessary to examine 
Boghossian’s notion of epistemic analyticity. Th is time, however, my aim 
is not to assess its credibility; rather, it is to identify which other prin-
ciples should enter the picture in order to explain why, as according to 
that conception, (maximal) semantic competence is indeed suffi  cient to 
yield knowledge.
One explanation of epistemic analyticity, applicable to just one rather 
specifi c kind of sentences that could be characterized in this way, might 
run as follows: 
EA1   A sentence of the form S is P is epistemically analytic whenever 
“S” is synonymous with “P”, and being knowledgeable of this 
semantic fact is what partially constitutes one’s ability to grasp 
the meaning of “S”, and of “P”.
If understanding what “S” means involves knowing that its meaning is 
the same as that of “P”, and vice versa, no one understanding both expres-
sions, and understanding the way in which they’re put together, may fail 
to know that S is P. Th is explanation is too specifi c, however, in view of 
the fact that many sentences which one might be willing to characterize 
as analytic do not exhibit the form just envisaged. Boghossian, to name 
just one, endorses the widespread opinion that many simple truths of logic 
perform a meaning-constituting function, and that, for this reason, they 
should be interpreted as implicit defi nitions of a fundamentally analytic 
nature. Explaining the epistemic analyticity of implicit defi nition should 
involve rather diff erent materials: for instance one might say that no one 
understanding an implicit defi nition can fail to know what it says because 
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it says what it says in virtue of the successful stipulation that it expresses a 
truth. However, by generalizing on the fi rst and the second case of analyt-
icities, one might be tempted to suggest that whatever explanation is given 
of the epistemic analyticity of a statement, it must at least be consistent 
with the following, loosely explanatory, principle:
EA2   A sentence S is epistemically analytic whenever its truth is guar-
anteed by facts relative to its meaning. 
EA2 is rather generic; yet it has the virtue of hinting at a possible expla-
nation, to be substantiated by individuating the particular role played by 
each type of the relevant meaning-facts, of the a priori knowability of epis-
temically analytic sentences. So long as their truth is guaranteed by facts 
concerning their meanings, and these facts are open to view for a person 
who’s able to understand those sentences, no mystery seems anymore to 
attach to the claim that that person will know, a priori, what these sentences 
say upon understanding them. A diff erent and no less crucial advantage 
of the view under consideration is that it puts no substantive constraint 
as to what analytic truth is to consist in. Since the principle just trades 
on meaning-facts guaranteeing a sentence to express a truth, EA2 does not 
beg the question against the proponent of the “metaphysical conception”, 
according to which meaning-facts determine truth, and is at the same time 
compatible with the claim that analytic statements, not diff erently than 
synthetic sentences, if true are true of reality10.
Th e problem, for Divers and Miller, is that EA2, despite its overt gen-
erality, seems already enough to cast doubt on either the Independence, 
or the Substantiality of the conditions of epistemic optimality that sup-
posedly constrain arithmetical best opinion, and truth. Let’s explain by 
fi rstly assessing Independence. Let us call MF the meaning-fact(s) which, 
according to the proponent of (5) (i.e., under the current assumption, 
of the epistemic analyticity of mathematics), guarantee(s) that a given 
arithmetical sentence, say p, indeed expresses a truth. Th e overall picture 
we have described so far allows us to understand why a subject S, if maxi-
mally competent with the concepts involved in p, will then be best suited 
to ascertain that it expresses a truth: because her conceptual abilities will 
10. If a sentence is analytic if its meaning what it does makes it the case that what it says is 
true, a fortiori its meaning what it does guarantees that it expresses a truth; on the other hand, 
if a sentence’s meaning what it does merely guarantees that it expresses a truth, its truth may 
well be determined otherwise. 
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put her in a position of maximal sensitivity, as it were, with respect to 
the relevant MF, to which the sentence owes the guarantee of its truth. 
However, this picture makes implicit reference to a parameter with respect 
to which arithmetical best opinion must defer, namely the nature of the 
relevant MF, which therefore is to be accorded a determination which 
is conceptually prior to, and then unable to be explained in light of the 
deliverances of best opinion.  If so, however, no room seems to be left 
for construing the activity of a mathematician operating in condition of 
maximal conceptual competence as one of constituting those truths; rather, 
the view that such an activity must be construed as one of detecting those 
truths seems to be inescapable.
Obviously enough, Divers and Miller can be credited, at this point, 
with one promising reply. However, as I shall show in a moment, it helps 
in escaping the charge of infringing Independence only at the condition 
of infringing, in turn, Substantiality. On behalf of Divers and Miller, it 
might be contended that so long as it is recognized that arithmetical best 
opinion, by determining the extension of arithmetical truth, is by the 
same token determining the nature of relevant meaning-facts, there is no 
diffi  culty in characterizing arithmetical truth as analytic. For if analytic 
truth is constrained in the way already envisaged by the relevant meaning-
facts, and these facts are best-opinion determined, also analytic truths will 
be best-opinion determined. So, it might be retorted that the contention 
that the characterization of arithmetical truth as epistemically analytic is at 
odds with the satisfaction of the independence condition begs the question 
of the Euthyphronist concerning (3). For such a contention is based on 
the outright denial of her central claim, that it is the nature of the relevant 
conceptual relationships which is constituted by best opinion.
However, such a reply would miss the central point in the foregoing 
argument. Th e objection it actually raises is not that analytic truth, sim-
pliciter, requires independently constituted meaning-facts. As the reply cor-
rectly emphasizes, we should stay neutral with respect to what determines 
the nature of mathematical concepts, and the Euthyphronist is primarily 
in the business of maintaining that it is best opinion that determines 
it. Rather, the problem is that the characterization of arithmetical truth 
as epistemically analytic, once paired with the claim that the nature of 
the relevant conceptual relations is best-opinion determined, cannot be 
used to motivate the substantial identifi cation of the C-conditions, in the 
arithmetical case, with maximal conceptual competence. To see why, it 
is just necessary to appreciate one simple point: if maximal conceptual
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competence is to constrain in any substantive way arithmetical best opin-
ion, it must be possible to assess whether a subject has the advertised 
feature, independently of what the deliverances of arithmetical best opin-
ion are. However, what the abovementioned reply wants us to consider 
is precisely the opposite point: along with this reply, whether a subject is 
maximally competent with the mathematical concepts straightforwardly 
depends on the deliverances of best opinion, in the very direct sense that 
whether she has things right, as far as her apprehension of the relations 
among mathematical concepts goes, depends on what a subject would judge 
when facing the relevant question in the advertised conditions, because 
such relationships are determined by what a subject would judge in such 
conditions. Th is leads us to the trivial formulation according to which 
whether subject S delivers best opinion about some arithmetical statement 
p depends on whether she has things right concerning the relations among 
the relevant concepts, which in turn now means that it depends on whether 
she apprehends those relations as they are determined by best opinion. 
As is clear, circularity—in other words insubstantiality—threatens: we 
wanted to illuminate the notion of arithmetical best opinion by inquiring 
under what conditions an opinion may be counted as best, and we are 
now returned to the answer that we can properly identify those conditions 
only in terms of the concept-determining role performed by best opinion. 
Th e latter point can be made more vivid in light of the following example.
Whether 7 is a prime number, according to the Euthyphronist, depends 
on whether a subject addressing the question in conditions of epistemic 
optimality would judge that 7 is a prime number. When asked to specify 
such conditions, Divers and Miller’s Euthyphronist returns the answer 
that arithmetical truths are analytic, and that, for this very reason, all 
that is required on a mathematician for her opinion to count as best is 
that she enjoys maximal conceptual competence with the concept of the 
number seven, and the concept of a prime number. Undeniably, this 
is supposed to mean that our mathematician has things right concern-
ing the relations among those concepts; this, in turn, is supposed to 
compel Divers and Miller’s Euthyphronist to say something substantive 
concerning the conditions under which a subject has things right con-
cerning those concepts. One possibility, which has already surfaced, is 
that a subject has things right if there is a fact of the matter, concerning 
whichever number, about whether that number is prime or not, and that 
the subject has the capability to track such facts. However, this answer 
is clearly unserviceable for the Euthyphronist, for her primary business 
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is to maintain that those facts are constituted, rather than tracked by a 
maximally competent mathematician. So, she is left with the answer that 
a subject’s competence is maximal when it is in line with the best-opinion 
determined nature of the concept of a prime number. By endorsing this 
alternative, however, Divers and Miller’s Euthyphronist annihilate the 
apparent progress made so far; for again, she has to face the question of 
what the best-opinion determined nature of the concept of a prime num-
ber is, and such question can hardly receive a satisfactory answer in the 
absence of a clear characterization of arithmetical best opinion. So Divers 
and Miller’s Euthyphronist has apparently to accept the consequence that 
her proposal amounts to clarifying the notion of best opinion through the 
notion of best opinion: a circle too tight to deserve the title of a substantial
characterization.
Explaining counterfactual convergence
Th e problem just emphasized seems to exemplify a more general tension 
between the independence condition and the substantiality condition. 
If a certain set of conditions has to constrain epistemic optimality in a 
substantial way—namely, if the supposition that those conditions are 
satisfi ed must explain why the opinions formed under those conditions 
are best suited to track the truth within a given area of discourse—a sub-
stantive story has to be told as to why, given the nature of the truths in 
question, and the means necessary for determining which ones they are, 
such conditions actually possess this feature. However, when a class of 
truths is characterized as judgment-dependent, no such story is seemingly 
forthcoming. For since the truths in questions are constituted rather than 
detected, the motivation behind any proposed specifi cation of the relevant 
C-conditions cannot be that, under those conditions, the thinkers are 
guaranteed to match the truth. Such motivation, making use of the truth-
matching metaphor, would in fact demand, in the fi rst place, an indepen-
dently constituted realm of truths in order for there to be something to 
be matched in the very fi rst place. Th is seems to be what goes wrong with 
Divers and Miller’s proposed specifi cation of the C-conditions. Maximal 
conceptual competence counts as a condition of epistemic optimality only 
if we conceive of arithmetical truth as independently constituted by the 
mathematical concepts.
Th is problem can also be illuminated from a diff erent perspective.
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Take any disputed bi-conditional, like (3) above, expressing the coinci-
dence, within a given area of discourse, between truth and best opinion. 
Wright’s request that the conditions under which an opinion would be 
best should be specifi ed substantially, at the same time should be taken to 
entail the request to explaining, substantially, why the opinions are bound 
to converge in conditions of epistemic optimality. In the very fi rst place, 
in fact, it could not be true that best opinion, characterized as opinion 
delivered under a specifi ed set of circumstances C, coincide with truth 
unless it were also true that those opinions, for the very fact of being issued 
under C, are guaranteed to converge. Th e problem, for the Euthyphronist, is 
that the most natural explanation of convergence involves the supposition 
that those opinions incorporate the aim of representing an independently 
constituted reality. Let’s explain.
Take two devices, like two cameras, which work by receiving inputs—
light stimulations—and by delivering a given output—a negative fi lm of a 
given sort. Our inclination to regard the output of a camera as a representa-
tion is grounded in our tendency to interpret lack of convergence along the 
following lines: were we to be faced with two divergent outputs delivered 
by two diff erent cameras, we would fi nd inescapable the view that either 
they have been pointed in diff erent directions, or, if they were not, that one 
of them—or maybe both—functions less than perfectly. In the opposite 
direction, we take convergence as the hallmark of representational function: 
when receiving the same inputs and working perfectly, two representational 
devices cannot but produce the same outputs (Wright 1992, 146).
Clearly enough, this does not logically entail that whenever two devices 
operating on the basis of the same inputs and working properly cannot 
but produce converging outputs then they must be thought to be repre-
sentational devices. Were it so, it would be true as a matter of logic that 
no discourse—mathematics included—could incorporate a judgment-
dependent truth-predicate11. Nonetheless, the latter train of thought would 
11. Th e obtaining of the C conditions arguably guarantees that any two subjects judging 
that p under those conditions must be receiving the very same inputs, because under those 
conditions, since by hypothesis such conditions are epistemically optimal, those subjects must 
enjoy all, and a fortiori the same, (relevant) information: my judgment that p could not be 
taken to be issued in conditions of epistemic optimality if, under those conditions, some bit of 
information relevant as to whether p could still escape me. Moreover, it seems to guarantee that 
they are not the resultant of what could be properly regarded as a cognitive mistake: I couldn’t 
be judging under epistemically optimal conditions if I were in a condition in which a cognitive 
shortcoming on my part still constituted a possibility. Finally, the truth of the bi-conditional 
encapsulating the co-variation of truth and best opinion requires convergence. Were the latter,
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seem to motivate at least some pessimism about the very availability of 
any explanation of convergence alternative to representational function. 
Whenever a discourse D is up for a Euthyphronic interpretation, in fact, 
the intuition that any two divergent D-opinions will have to be explained 
either by supposing them to be outcome of divergent inputs, or the out-
come of cognitive malfunction, will be imposed on us: in that case, the 
truth of the relevant instance of EC will command the view that, had both 
opinions been formed under the C-conditions, they would have had to 
converge, and so enforce the conclusion that one of them, or both, will 
have to be explained as the resultant either of partial information (so 
divergent data) or of less-than-proper cognitive functioning (cognitive 
shortcoming); this, however, will be germane to supposing, along with the 
suggestion above, that these opinions will already be compromised with 
representational function.
Th is result might legitimately raise the following question: since the 
envisaged convergence of the opinions issued under C seems to rule out 
any sensible explanation having no business with the idea that they perform 
a genuinely representational function, and the latter function imposes the 
thought that they are responsive to the independent realm of facts which 
they have the function to describe, how could the simultaneous satisfac-
tion of the Substantiality condition and of the Independence condition 
constitute as much as a possibility?
Although the latter question might sound rhetorical, I do not think it 
is. Th e simple recipe for having both desiderata—substantially explaining 
convergence without infringing independence—is just to incorporate 
representational function, while at the same time “cordoning off ” its eff ect 
with respect to the constitutional role played by subjectivity in determining 
the extension of the facts over which opinion in a discourse varies; one 
way could be the following: the facts which a thinker must be thought to 
be reliably responsive to, when delivering her verdicts under conditions 
of epistemic optimality, must be divorced from the facts reported by the 
truths that are allegedly constituted by those verdicts. To put it bluntly: 
if one’s claim is that the truths in A are judgment-dependent, and, along 
with the suggestion above, one’s commitment is to explaining why the 
satisfaction of C entails converging verdicts as to the statements expressible 
within A, such explanation must somehow let this convergence depend on 
together with the sameness of inputs/proper cognitive function, to entail representational func-
tion, every discourse subject to the latter bi-conditional would have to be interpreted Socratically. 
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the fact that, for some independently constituted facts B, subjects operat-
ing under C, when delivering best opinion as to A, are reliably responsive 
to, and therefore epistemically constrained by, B. A possibility is when 
the properties dealt with within A supervene on the properties dealt with
within B.
Consider the claim that truth in the chromatic discourse is judgment-
dependent, and the claim that chromatic properties supervene on physical 
properties. Th e former claim commits one to accepting, for every colour 
ascription, bi-conditionals of the kind exemplifi ed by the following one:
(3**)  x is red iff  (C  S judges that x is red)
For S ranging over actual perceivers, and C specifi ed in a substantial 
way, acceptance of (3**) commits one to providing an explanation as to 
why, under conditions C, every perceiver constituted as the actual ones 
would judge, when faced by x, that it is red.
Now consider the latter claim, according to which chromatic properties 
(CP) supervene on physical properties (PP). Th is claim makes available 
the following explanation of the convergence of the verdicts delivered by 
actual perceivers operating under optimal epistemic conditions. Suppose 
that R designates the distinctive subjective reaction (the distinctive quale) 
which actually statistically standard subjects experience when observing, 
in actually good epistemic and environmental conditions (in brief, under 
conditions C), objects refl ecting the light along with certain patterns. Sup-
pose that R is the distinctive perceptual seeming that disposes competent 
speakers of English, when conditions are knowledgeably of the C-kind, to 
judge that those objects are red. Suppose further that this distinctive pat-
tern of light refl ection, resulting in actually standard subjects experiencing 
R, depend on the PP of the objects. If background conditions are kept 
invariant, the preceding suppositions enforce the thought that every (lin-
guistically competent) perceiver operating under C, if faced by an object 
x instantiating some PP of the relevant kind, will experience R, and will 
consequently judge that x is red.
In the case at issue we clearly have both desiderata. On the one hand, 
convergence is explained by the fact that opinion over the distribu-
tion of CP is responsive to the PP things possess, so that, whenever the 
C-conditions obtain, and we thereby have the guarantee that no mal-
functioning is in place, we are assured that actual perceivers will deliver 
converging verdicts. By the same token, the truth conditions of chromatic
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ascriptions, given the constitutive involvement of the subjective reactions 
elicited by the perceptual interaction with PP, are still to be characterized 
as judgment-dependent. Th e point, subtly enough, is that the superve-
nience thesis accomplishes the delicate function of imbuing the opinions 
formed under the C-conditions with the “quantity” of responsiveness to 
mind-independently constituted facts which suffi  ces to preserve a role 
for subjectivity in determining the extensions of the relevant predicates 
without at the same time preventing the desired convergence of opinion
from arising.
Now, the question is: can the non-Gödelian Platonist devise a similar 
strategy to explain the convergence in opinion of the mathematicians oper-
ating under conditions C? Arguably, this is an accomplishable task only if 
the opinions delivered by the mathematicians operating under conditions 
C can be shown to be responsive to facts diff erent than the arithmetical 
ones, in a way, however, which still makes room for the attribution to 
the mathematicians’ subjectivity of a role in determining the arithmetical 
statements’ extension.
In concluding this paper, I would like to stress few points that argu-
ably tell against the availability of a similar strategy to the non-Gödelian 
Platonist.
Th e main asymmetry between the colour case and the arithmetical case 
seems to be that, in the former one, there is one single category of objects to 
which PP and CP can be attributed, namely the physical objects of every-
day experience. In the arithmetical case, on the contrary, we cannot have 
that just one single category of objects is involved. Th e reason is that, while 
the arithmetical truths, taken at face value, are about mathematical objects, 
the facts that the mathematicians must be thought of as being responsive to 
must not have as constituents mathematical objects, in that they, on pain 
of confl icting with the judgment-dependence of arithmetical truth, must 
not be arithmetical facts. If it is so, the non-Gödelian Platonist is faced 
by an unpalatable alternative. Either she conceives of the mathematical 
objects, as contrasted with the objects her opinions are representationally 
responsive to, as non-existing objects. However, no form of Platonism can 
be arguably divorced from the claim that mathematical objects exist. More 
than this, the non-Gödelian Platonist is also banned from choosing this 
alternative by her endorsement of the Syntax Priority Th esis. So she must 
admit that the arithmetical opinions formed, as it were, under the pres-
sure of the interaction with the underlying category of facts and objects, 
are about objects to which existence must be attributed. However, if this 
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is the horn the Platonist is likely to choose, it is not clear how she will be 
able to explain how it is that arithmetical opinions, though prompted by 
the interaction with the underlying basis, nonetheless concern mathemati-
cal objects. Th e most obvious possibility, to plead for an interpretation 
of arithmetical discourse as being reducible to the discourse about the 
underlying basis clearly does not work; for it entails the outright denial 
of the claim that arithmetical statements must be taken at face value, and 
that numerals actually refer to numbers.
A possibility, at this point, might be constituted by re-interpreting the 
implicated relation of supervenience as having diff erent relata than the 
argument above suggests12. Th e idea, defended above, is that the situation 
of the colour theorist, aiming to vindicate the judgment-dependent nature 
of chromatic discourse, and that of the non-Gödelian Platonist, aiming to 
vindicate the judgment-dependent nature of arithmetical discourse, are cru-
cially asymmetric, in that just the former, and not the latter has plain access 
to the suggestion that the allegedly judgment-dependent discourse trades 
with facts which supervene on some underlying and ontologically fi rmer 
basis. Th e most compelling reason that has emerged so far is that the non-
Gödelian Platonist, unlike the colour theorist, has to look for a basis upon 
which what supervenes is a given kind of objects, rather than properties.
Th is threatens to make a mystery of the nonnegotiable presupposition that 
mathematical statements indeed involve reference to numbers. However, 
it might be suggested, there is no principled reason why the non-Gödelian 
Platonist should look at the relevant supervenience relation that way. Sup-
pose in fact that she identifi es the basis with numerals and other math-
ematical symbols, plus, perhaps, the rules given for their manipulation; and 
that she then maintains that the relevant supervenience relation obtains 
among such phenomena and content-involving mathematical experiences. 
Th ese experiences undeniably involve apparent reference to numbers; yet 
the ontological status of these entities seems to be somewhat derivative, as 
such experiences actually supervene on the perceptual encounter with the 
real objects, the mathematical symbols. Th e latter intuition, so the proposal 
might continue, might be captured by drawing a distinction between two 
diff erent contexts of appraisals for existence claims: on the one side we have 
the “ontology room” governed by its own more demanding standards, on 
the other we have the ordinary street outside the ontology room, where 
the standards of appraisals are somewhat more relaxed. Statements giving 
12. I owe this suggestion to an anonymous referee.
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expressions to the content of experiences, as under the current proposal 
mathematical content-involving experiences, which supervene on some-
thing else, as in the case at issue mathematical symbols, are just true in 
the ordinary sense, yet literally false when assessed within the ontology 
room. Th is, it might be contended, might well be enough for having all 
the non-Gödelian Platonist needs: supervenience, mathematical truth, and
judgment-dependency.
Well, in response it should be observed that, in this way, the non-
Gödelian Platonist would have far more than she needs, indeed too much, 
and for two diff erent reasons. In the very fi rst place, the proposal under 
scrutiny crucially depends on the distinction among diff erent contexts 
of appraisals: by resorting to it, the non-Gödelian Platonist can coher-
ently maintain that mathematical statements are (sometimes) true, yet 
preserve a role for subjectivity in determining this; yet in this way what 
becomes mysterious is what in her position, if anything, does deserve the 
label “Platonism”: everybody accepting the distinction could be moved 
to appreciate that many content-involving experiences of a supervenient 
variety must turn out true under the ordinary context of evaluation, 
although arguably false within the ontology room; so the real disagree-
ment among a consistent Platonist and a consistent anti-Platonist, once 
the distinction enters the picture, seems to concern how existence state-
ments (or statements which imply those statements) should be evaluated 
within, and not just outside, the more demanding context. Accordingly, 
it seems safe to conclude that the distinction at issue obfuscates, rather 
than vindicates, the distinctive Platonist component that non-Gödelian 
Platonism is in the business to preserve. A second reason for resisting 
the suggestion moreover derives from the distinction among judgment-
dependent truth, and mind-independent existence, which the reply at 
issue somewhat tends to obscure. Th e suggestion under scrutiny is that 
whenever some content-involving experience about some A supervenes (in 
the re-interpreted sense just advertised) on some base B, we should have 
to conclude that claims like “there is an A” is judgment-dependently true, 
and so true just outside, and not within the ontology room; however, what 
does seem to follow in the fi rst place, once the (revisionary) supervenience 
thesis  is in place, is that A exists mind-dependently; from this it arguably 
follows that “A exists” if true is also judgment-dependently true, yet at 
a cost which a sound Platonist shouldn’t be able to aff ord: a Platonist is 
primarily in the business to vindicate the existence, as mind-independent 
entities, of numbers; yet by endorsing the suggestion at issue she should 
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have to admit that numbers exist, though qua objects of human aware-
ness, and so mind-dependently (for a extended defence of this claim, see
Piazza 2009).
Whether there is some other possibility plausibly constitutes an open 
question. Unless it is convincingly indicated, however, the provisional 
conclusion seems to be warranted that the non-Gödelian Platonist is not 
in a good position for explaining convergence. So, not only does the pro-
posed specifi cation of the C conditions, based on its characterization as 
analytic truth, fail to constitute a possibility. Also no other characterization, 
modelled on the colour case, seems to be open to her.
Conclusion
In this paper I have tried to dispel the impression that the Non-Gödelian 
Platonist is indeed in a position to escape Field’s dilemma. To show this, I 
have questioned that arithmetical truth can be characterized as judgment-
dependent in the sense championed by Crispin Wright.
To show this I have argued that, if it has to be characterized as judgment-
dependent, arithmetical truth cannot be characterized as analytic truth. 
Th at would entail the violation of the condition according to which, if a 
body of truth is judgment-dependent, then its extension cannot be con-
ceived as predetermined with respect to the opinions delivered in optimal 
epistemic conditions by the relevant subjects. More than this, I have 
argued that the non-Gödelian Platonist is arguably unable to explain, as 
required by the supposition that arithmetical truth is judgment-dependent, 
why actual mathematicians would converge in their opinions under ideal 
epistemic conditions. As in the case of colour ascriptions, such explana-
tion would require the non-Gödelian Platonist to identify a class of facts, 
diff erent than the arithmetical ones, but arguably related in some way to 
them, the responsiveness to which explains the convergence of arithmeti-
cal opinion in conditions of epistemic optimality. I have argued that no 
such identifi cation is consistent with respect to the prima facie semantic 
datum that arithmetical statements are about numbers.
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